Breaking down the 2022 FA Women’s Cup final
Chelsea and Manchester City were the Women’s Super League’s in-form teams going into this Saturday’s FA Cup final, and they produced a scintillating game of football befitting the occasion. There were five goals, moments of brilliance, momentum swings and some late drama. It had everything you would want in a cup final. This time, Chelsea came out on top, with a 3–2 win in extra time. Here is my analysis of the game.
Starting line-ups and some pre-match context
Manchester City set up as expected: in a 4–3–3 formation with an open midfield triangle of Keira Walsh sitting, Georgia Stanway and Caroline Weir attacking. Bunny Shaw started up front instead of Ellen White, and her selection was essential to City’s performance. Chelsea lined up in a 3–4–3. Aniek Nouwen came into the back line between Millie Bright and Magdalena Eriksson. Jess Carter played on the right wing, with Guro Reiten on the left. Up front, Pernille Harder roamed behind Sam Kerr and Beth England.
Some pre-match comments highlighted the difference between the managers in terms of their approach to big games. Chelsea’s Emma Hayes talked about it being a ‘chess match’, while City’s Gareth Taylor talked of ‘slugging it out’. Hayes approached the final as a tactician, willing to make changes to hurt the opposition. Taylor approached it with resolute belief in his team’s typical style of play.
Chelsea man-marking disrupts City’s flow
Hayes has changed formations throughout this season, and decided to go with a 3–4–3 for this game. This allowed Chelsea to match up man-to-man when Man City tried to play their usual short passes from the back. Chelsea’s strikers closed down the centre-backs (2v2), their wing-backs closed down the full-backs (2v2), Harder marked Walsh (1v1), their central midfielders marked City’s attacking mids (2v2), and their centre-back three went up against City’s front three of Shaw-Hemp-Kelly (3v3).
Every time City passed sideways along the back line or into a midfielder, they were closed down by a dark blue shirt. Chelsea’s flexible man-marking* meant they were ready immediately to intercept under-hit passes and bad touches, and that they could put quick pressure on their opponents to tackle or force a mistake. City’s defenders lacked time to organise themselves on the ball and their midfielders had to receive facing their own goal with a Chelsea player breathing down their neck.
*Chelsea’s man-marking here was not as rigid as, say, Wolfsburg’s against Arsenal in the Champions League. Versus Arsenal, Wolfsburg sacrificed their shape to man-mark all over the pitch. Here, Chelsea man-marked flexibly, meaning players chose between getting tight to their opponent or covering space, depending on where the ball was, so as to maintain some defensive shape.
City were often forced all the way back to goalkeeper Ellie Roebuck. Roebuck had time to play, but every short option came with serious risk, so she repeatedly went long, which isn’t City’s ideal situation as it doesn’t let them get into a flow with their short passing. City also lack physical presence across their midfield and attack. The only viable target for long balls was Shaw, and she became more influential with every passing minute.
In the 31st minute, Chelsea opened the scoring after Bright swung in a looping cross and Kerr attacked the far post to head home from close range. Just looking at that play, people might not see game plans, and instead think Chelsea got lucky to score. But that move was the second phase of a free kick that came about from Chelsea pressing man-to-man, winning possession in City’s half and forcing a desperate lunge from Alanna Kennedy, fouling Harder. Hayes’ defensive system was directly involved in creating the opportunity from which Chelsea made it 1–0.
City press well, but Chelsea have some answers
Man City also pressed well to force long balls and mistakes from Chelsea. In the past, City’s defensive system has been a 4–4–2, with White joined by an attacking mid to lead the pressure. Now, they defend in the same formation as they attack: a 4–3–3, with the wingers supporting the striker in high pressing.
Kelly and Hemp are both quick, and they were responsible for closing down their direct opponent, then following up on the next pass sideways or backwards. This was done to try and rush Chelsea — if the next pass wasn’t quicker than Hemp or Kelly’s sprint speed, they were in trouble. Shaw, meanwhile, would mix pressing with blocking routes into midfield, standing in front of Ingle or Cuthbert. That would force sideways passing, and initiate the pressing of Kelly+Hemp.
At times, Chelsea were forced back to their goalkeeper, and Ann-Katrin Berger’s medium/long passing wasn’t always accurate. This led to some dangerous losses of possession in the midfield area and good counter-attacking opportunities for City, where they could dribble straight at the last line of defence. However, Chelsea were able to find some answers to the questions posed by City’s pressing game.
One answer was the switch ball out to the wing-backs, Carter and Reiten. Because City’s pressing was led by their wingers, this left their full-backs a bit exposed. Chelsea exploited this through switches from one side to the other to get their wing-backs into 1v1s, and they looked to draw out City’s full-backs before playing in Kerr or England, who both ran the channels well and had the strength to hold the ball under pressure from City’s centre-backs.
There were also times where Chelsea could play through their opponent, using the space opening up between the lines as City pressed to find one of their forwards with a ball to feet. England was particularly good at showing for the ball, then laying off for a teammate. These routines were an effective way of getting their midfielders on the ball in a position to play forward. Once these lay-offs were played, Chelsea looked to attack fast, with switches or balls into space behind for a striker to run onto.
In the final third, Chelsea looked to work crosses with Kerr, England and Harder all posing some kind of threat in the penalty box (Kerr and England are effective attacking the ball in the air). They looked more dangerous down their left side, mainly because Reiten’s crossing is more accurate and varied than Carter’s (Carter is, after all, naturally a defender, while Reiten is a natural winger). Still, Reiten’s crossing wasn’t always on point, and Roebuck took control of her penalty box well on those high balls.
Shaw changes the game, City go more direct
City found it almost impossible to impose their short passing game upon Chelsea, and were forced into long balls. It was only when they started looking for Shaw directly that they began to play themselves out of pressure consistently. Shaw may not yet have the ruthlessness and penalty box movement of Ellen White, but she does a lot of stuff away from the box. She’s 6ft tall, strong with good control, and quick enough to run past an over-eager defender. At times she bullied Aniek Nouwen, and the Dutch centre-back was eventually substituted after a challenging afternoon.
Shaw held the ball up well, then looked to lay-off to bring Stanway and Weir into the play. She gave City some security against Chelsea’s man-marking game, allowing City to bypass multiple layers of defence and get up the pitch consistently. She also ran the channel well, pulling out to the right and winning in a couple of 1v1 situations after a ball over the top. It isn’t what you might expect from City, but it worked.
On 41 minutes, Roebuck used the time Chelsea gave her on the ball to flight a ball up to Shaw. Backing into Nouwen, the striker then turned her opponent and got running at Chelsea’s back line, before playing in Hemp to score. This was the sort of individual out-playing that is absolutely vital against man-marking systems. If one player can handle the pressure and escape their marker, the game suddenly opens up.
Shaw gave this outlet to City, and a lot of their best attacking moments came from her individual ability to take defenders out. Later, in the 50th minute, Keira Walsh turned Beth England with a brilliant outside-of-the-foot turn. All of a sudden, she had won her 1v1 and the game opened up in front of her. Walsh could run forward, pick out Stanway, and City were on the attack against an unset Chelsea defence. These instances were particularly dangerous because City have multiple attackers with good pace and dribbling skill. Once they have opened up their opponent and have space to run into, they are difficult to nullify.
Unable to play short passing combinations from the back, City found more success from players showing composure, strength and quality on the ball to win their 1v1s. Once they got up into the final third, they tried to combine and work better angles to cross or shoot, but were repelled mostly by a well-organised and committed Chelsea back five. This is why City only managed four shots on target. Chelsea were set up well to narrow angles, make blocks and clear their lines. Even if City did get a decent sight of goal, Berger put in a strong goalkeeping performance behind her defence.
Chelsea leave two up and threaten in transitions
Chelsea’s choice of formation meant they were able to match up when pressing City high up the pitch, whilst simultaneously having good numbers back to drop and defend their own box if necessary. In transitions, it also gave them a lot of threat from simple clearances and long balls. They left two up top, Kerr and England, with Harder supporting them. This is a trio with the pace, strength and skill to cause problems on quick counter-attacks. When Chelsea regained the ball deep, they regularly looked to hit one of the three or play the long ball into space for them to run onto.
City’s attacking system is quite expansive, and both full-backs get involved in attacks. If one was not sharp enough to cover, their centre-backs could be left in difficult situations of even numbers or being out-numbered on quick counters. At times, City’s centre-backs were forced to defend 1v1 on the touchline, and a mistake in this situation by Kennedy in extra time led to Kerr running through to score on a breakaway.
This is classic cup final Chelsea: counter-attacking quickly with direct play based around athletic strikers that centre-backs find almost impossible to deal with 1v1. For what it’s worth, Greenwood had a terrific game and did a good job of controlling Kerr for the most part. But it only takes a mistake or two in these transitional moments for the game to be won and lost. That’s what happened here.
Extra time
Chelsea, understandably, couldn’t keep the same pressing intensity all the way through extra time. They also hampered themselves with substitutions before normal time was complete. When Greenwood found Hayley Raso with a diagonal ball in behind to score an 89th-minute equaliser, forwards England and Harder had already been replaced by midfielders Ji and Jessie Fleming.
More and more, City found time for themselves on the ball as their opponents became more focused on containing than closing down. But the wall of Chelsea’s back five — with extra help from Ingle, Cuthbert and good goalkeeping from Berger — held on. City failed to get a shot on target in extra time, which tells you a bit about how well Chelsea defended their lead.
And, as the minutes went on, Chelsea focused more on keeping the ball in City’s half and managing the tempo of the game. The front three of Kerr, Ji and Fleming stayed close to each other to support one another and create short passing options to combine, taking some pressure off their defence and running down the clock.
Conclusion: Why basic stats don’t tell the whole story
At the end of the game, Chelsea had taken nine shots, four on target, while Man City had 23 shots, four on target. City also dominated the ball, with 61% possession. On paper, this suggests City dominance. But that wasn’t the case in reality, and the 4–4 shot-on-target numbers are probably the ones worth paying real attention to.
City are the more possession-focused team. It’s the way their team has been built and it’s what they are all about. They prefer to attack via short passes and combinations, to enter the final third with the ball controlled on the deck and the opponent opened up. Chelsea, on the other hand, are much more open-minded about mixing things up, and have two physical strikers in Kerr and England who offer good targets for direct play.
Naturally, City were going to have more of the ball, and it’s also worth pointing out the predominant game state. Chelsea took the lead three times. City never once took the lead. All in all, taking into account 120 minutes of normal + extra time (not including stoppage time)…
- The game was tied for 64 minutes (equal footing)
- Chelsea were ahead for 56 minutes (City chasing the game)
In these circumstances, it is normal that City had more possession, longer spells of putting pressure on the opponent and, subsequently, more attempts at goal. But very few of those attempts made it past Chelsea’s defenders and hit the target.
Hayes will be happy that her defensive game-plan worked, stopping City from finding their short-passing rhythm. Taylor will be happy that his players, particularly Shaw, showed their quality to make things happen and kept believing to come back twice. One regret he may have is substituting the game-changing Shaw for White, sticking by his principles to keep the 4–3–3 system rather than pairing the two strikers for extra time and giving Chelsea’s back line more to worry about. Still, this was a great final, a contest between two very different but well-matched teams, and it was a game of fine margins.
Thank you for reading! If you have time and are feeling very kind, please do share on social media, Blair.
- Twitter: @thesecondball
- Email: blairn22@gmail.com
